Judicial Appointments Commission is compromised by synthetic identity fraud.
Andrew Kennon is compromised by his three identities. Questions to be answered.
20/6/23
By email: complaints@judicialappointments.gov.uk
Complaints Manager
Judicial Appointments Commission
5th Floor, Clive House
70 Petty France
London, SW1H 9EX
Re: Inconsistencies in the Register of Interests of Andrew Kennon.
Dear Complaints Manager,
Andrew Kennon's Register of Interest includes:
• Secretary - Friends of St Michael's Musbury
• Constitution Society – chair of board of trustees
• Independent Monitoring Board - Exeter Prison
• Occasional consultancy on parliamentary practice with other Parliaments through Global Partners Governance and Westminster Foundation for Democracy
His biography provides the following history, Andrew Kennon – Judicial Appointments Commission
“Andrew Kennon was appointed to the JAC as a lay member on 1 September 2017 and reappointed on 1 September 2020.
Andrew worked for 39 years as a Clerk in the House of Commons, retiring in 2017 after five years as Clerk of Committees. He has advised on governance and constitutional law and written and lectured on parliamentary and constitutional issues throughout his career. He has worked on all aspects of parliamentary reform and was closely involved in the internal governance of the House of Commons.
He is the editor (with Professor Robert Blackburn) of ‘Parliament: Functions, Practice and Procedures’ and has extensive experience of speaking and advising other parliaments, abroad and in the UK, on best practice.”
His records in Companies House were located, he has at least 3 identities registered:
Identity 1
Andrew KENNON Andrew KENNON personal appointments - Find and update company information - GOV.UK (company-information.service.gov.uk)
Total number of appointments 1
Date of birth July 1955
THE CONSTITUTION SOCIETY (07432769)
Company status Active
Correspondence address
61 Petty France, London, SW1H 9EU
Role ACTIVE Director
Appointed on 6 January 2017
Occupation Trustee
Identity 2
Andrew Rowland KENNON Andrew Rowland KENNON personal appointments - Find and update company information - GOV.UK (company-information.service.gov.uk)
Total number of appointments 2
Date of birth July 1955
DRYDEN COURT (FREEHOLD) LIMITED (03231276)
Company status Active
Correspondence address
9 Dryden Court, Renfrew Road, London, England, SE11 4NH
Role RESIGNED Director
Appointed on 30 April 2004
Resigned on 27 June 2017
Occupation Public Servant
DRYDEN COURT (TRUSTEES) LIMITED (05046861)
Company status Active
Correspondence address
9 Dryden Court, Renfrew Road, London, SE11 4NH
Role RESIGNED Director
Appointed on 6 April 2005
Resigned on 27 June 2017
Occupation Public Servant
Andrew Rowland KENNON
Total number of appointments 1
Date of birth July 1955
INDUSTRY AND PARLIAMENT TRUST (01308583)
Company status Active
Correspondence address
House Of Commons, Palace Of Westminster, London, England, SW1A 0AA
Role RESIGNED Director
Appointed on 6 July 2015
Resigned on 5 September 2016
Occupation Public Servant
Andrew Kennon registers his interest held in the first identity correctly. The appointments to the other identities, Dryden Court (Freehold) Limited, Dryden Court (Trustees) Limited and Industry and Parliament Trust are not disclosed within his biography. To fulfil obligations of transparency, these interests should be included in his biography. An example of how multiple identities corrupts transparency, is that Mr Kennon's past directorship of The Industry and Parliament Trust would not be apparent to anyone referencing the record of The Constitution Society, and this prior association would remain unknown as it held in an unrelated identity.
Please will Mr Kennon clarify which Global Partners Governance company does he works for, as there are two companies that use these three names:
GLOBAL PARTNERS GOVERNANCE FOUNDATION LTD
12533227 - Incorporated on 25 March 2020
Unit 2 10 Boundary St, London, United Kingdom, E2 7JE
GLOBAL PARTNERS GOVERNANCE PRACTICE LIMITED
08435805 - Incorporated on 8 March 2013
Unit 2 10 Boundary Street, London, England, E2 7JE
Having two companies registered with similar names and slightly different addresses can enable various fraudulent activities. Some of the potential frauds that can be facilitated by such registrations include:
Misrepresentation: The existence of multiple companies with similar names and addresses can confuse customers, suppliers, and investors. Fraudsters may intentionally create these entities to mislead and deceive others, leading to financial losses or improper business transactions.
Identity theft: Fraudsters can exploit the presence of multiple companies to engage in identity theft. By using similar names and addresses, they may impersonate one company to gain access to sensitive information or engage in fraudulent activities, such as obtaining credit or conducting illegal transactions.
Money laundering: The registration of multiple companies with slight variations in names and addresses can be used as a strategy for money laundering. Fraudsters may manipulate these entities to create complex financial transactions and disguise the origins of illicit funds, making it difficult for authorities to trace the money trail.
Tax evasion: Multiple companies with similar names and addresses can be utilised to evade taxes by engaging in fraudulent accounting practices. Fraudsters may exploit these entities to under report income, overstate expenses, or manipulate financial records, thereby evading taxes owed to the government.
It is crucial for regulatory authorities, auditors, and diligent individuals to be aware of such fraudulent practices and exercise caution when dealing with companies that exhibit these characteristics. Thorough due diligence, proper verification of identities, and reporting any suspicious activities to the relevant authorities can help mitigate the risks associated with these fraudulent practices.
The primary concern is the potential for misrepresentation or misinterpretation of the member's involvement with Global Partners Governance due to the existence of multiple entities with similar names. To mitigate this risk, it is important to ensure clear and accurate communication about the specific company the member is associated with when referring to Global Partners Governance. This will help prevent any confusion or misattributions that may arise from the shared name and address.
Additionally, it may be prudent to encourage the member to provide specific and unambiguous information regarding their affiliation with Global Partners Governance, such as mentioning the company number or other distinguishing details, to avoid any potential misunderstandings or incorrect assumptions and maintain transparency in their professional associations.
Mr Kennon also registers that he works for The Westminster Foundation for Democracy Limited, which is controlled by the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, the records are found here THE WESTMINSTER FOUNDATION FOR DEMOCRACY LIMITED persons with significant control - Find and update company information - GOV.UK (company-information.service.gov.uk).
Responsibilities of Companies House and Individuals in Addressing Duplicated Identities and Risks.
1. Companies House serves as the registrar for companies in the UK, responsible for maintaining accurate records of company directors. Their de-duplication system analyses officer names, dates of birth, and usual residential addresses (URAs) to associate appointments with the same individual. If all criteria are not met and the information is deemed inconsistent, the appointments remain separate. (Source: Registrars Functions Caseworker, Companies House, 22 May 2023)
2. Duplicated identities emerge when different names, dates of birth, or usual residential addresses are submitted, causing the Companies House de-duplication system to fail in recognising that these identities belong to the same person. In IT systems terminology duplicated identities are known as synthetic identities and these are an undesired outcome. They are the result of “false non-match errors” within the Companies House de-duplication system.
3. Companies House, as the system administrator, bears a fundamental duty to actively monitor and minimise false non-match errors and the creation of synthetic identities. It is within the authority and duty of Companies House to de-duplicate these records and ensure the integrity of the system.
4. UK Companies House director registration details are used for proof of identity primarily by banks, auditors, and businesses conducting due diligence. These details serve as a “reliable” source of information to verify the identity of directors, their roles within the company, and their historical appointments. This information is crucial for conducting risk assessments, compliance checks, and establishing business relationships based on accurate and up-to-date data.
5. If an individual holds a second identity in Companies House, it poses several risks. Firstly, it creates a lack of transparency and accountability as the true identity and affiliations of the individual may be concealed. This can hinder the ability of banks, auditors, and businesses to accurately assess the individual's background and potential conflicts of interest. It may also lead to fraudulent activities, such as using the second identity to engage in illegal or unethical practices, money laundering, or evading legal obligations.
6. Companies House's failure to de-duplicate synthetic identities facilitates synthetic identity fraud, undermining the integrity of corporate governance and compromise the trust of stakeholders.
7. Individuals have a responsibility to provide accurate information and keep it up to date, ensuring the authenticity and reliability of the records. If a synthetic identity is created in error, the director holds the duty to promptly correct the record and provide accurate information.
8. Failure to declare interests held in synthetic identities serves as evidence that the individual provided inaccurate information purposefully, to register the synthetic identity and to conceal financial interests.
To demonstrate how the situation described aligns with the definitions of fraud under the Fraud Act 2006, here's a breakdown of the relevant sections:
Fraud by false representation:
The creation of synthetic identities and failure to disclose relevant information can constitute fraud by false representation. By submitting inaccurate or incomplete details to Companies House, individuals misrepresent their true identity, affiliations, and potential conflicts of interest. This misrepresentation can deceive stakeholders, such as banks, auditors, and businesses, who rely on accurate information for risk assessments and compliance checks.
Fraud by failing to disclose information:
Failure to disclose interests held in synthetic identities falls under fraud by failing to disclose information. Individuals have a legal obligation to disclose their interests to Companies House and the public, as outlined in the Companies Act 2006. By intentionally omitting these interests, individuals withhold material information that could influence the assessment of their background, potential conflicts, and their ability to act in the best interests of the public.
Fraud by abuse of position:
The failure to disclose interests and the use of multiple identities can also be considered fraud by abuse of position. Public officials, such as Members of Parliament, hold positions of trust and responsibility. By concealing their interests and utilizing synthetic identities, these individuals abuse their positions for personal gain or to further undisclosed agendas. This constitutes an abuse of the trust placed in them by the public.
In summary, the actions described in the text align with the definitions of fraud under sections 2, 3, and 4 of the Fraud Act 2006. The creation of synthetic identities, failure to disclose information, and abuse of position can all be seen as fraudulent behaviours that undermine transparency, integrity, and public trust.
I have observed and reported several instances where individuals within the investigative body themselves have been implicated in breaches involving multiple identities. This discovery raises legitimate concerns about potential biases or conflicts of interest that may compromise the objectivity and impartiality of the investigation. To preserve the integrity of the process and ensure the trust of all parties involved, it is imperative that the investigation be carried out by individuals who are free from such associations.
Yours sincerely,
Alison Wright