I missed the deadline to be nominated as an independent PCC candidate in the forthcoming elections
Action Plan!
I must apologise that I failed to check my diary and mistakenly believed the deadline for submission of nomination papers for Police and Crime Commissioner for Sussex, was at 5pm instead of 4pm. I let myself down and the 132 Sussex residents who signed my nomination form. As I missed the deadline, even though my papers were complete.
Throughout this process, I’ve been vocal about my research into organised fraud methods, particularly concerning our incumbent PCC and CC. My findings revealed concerning breaches of the law. Both are acting beyond their delegated powers by being directors of private not-for-profit companies, without proper declaration for auditing purposes.
Katy Bourne had her appointments spread across 3 identities (now deduplicated as a result of my complaint) and Jo Shiner still has 2 identities (the reason why she has compromised herself like this isn't clear to me yet). These are breaches of the Companies Act 2006 Section 1082.
My inquiries with the Crown Prosecution Service for information on prosecutions relating to these Sections of the Act, yielded shocking results - they have “no information.” This is because this method of fraud has never been prosecuted. This means that "synthetic identity fraud" has been occurring unchecked since Companies House started.
We rely on auditors to prevent such fraud, that’s the whole reason for having audits. Auditors have multiple standards documents describing their duty to be “professionally sceptical” and seek and test for fraud in the accounts. However the Standards omit to include any consideration of whether an individual may be holding multiple identities in which they are concealing interests that they are failing to declare to the auditor, in another identity.
As a result of accounting and auditing training, and regimented audit process, the accountants and auditors who we rely on to keep big business operating legally, have been missing this method of fraud, since their profession began.
The impact of small businesses engaging with this may not be significant and prosecutions therefore would not be in the “public’s best interest” which is the test for whether to prosecute, or not.
That this method of fraud is widespread in Parliament and the Lords, and regulators like MHRA, HM Revenue & Customs, police leadership, some auditors and lawyers, means that our systems of governance are built on an illusion of transparency and accountability.
The laws that multiple identities contravene are the laws that are established to prevent money laundering, people trafficking and terrorism financing. These are the crimes that we are at risk of, by having politicians and regulators that are duplicitous. Multiple identities give them the means to operate serious organised crime from within Government through Public-Private Partnerships with other duplicitous actors.
Fraud is alarmingly prevalent. It’s the most common crime in the UK, making up 40% or all crime reports (and the Crime Survey estimates that just 13% of all fraud is reported). Fraud leaches £40 billion out of publics pockets. Over half of the fraud is fraud against the public sector. So “Government” are losing More than £20 billion of tax-payers hard earned cash to fraud each year.
It’s a big problem. You would have thought Action Fraud would be keen to receive my evidential reports, showing what’s going on. However, I have spent many hours making reports to Action Fraud without succeeding in initiating any investigation.
This failure to address fraudulent activities is partly because no precedent has been set for the crimes I am referring, so the language has not been defined in the Action Fraud systems. Hence fields, into which you might link to Companies House addresses for evidence, are too short to hold the address. However, I have raised this short-coming and the problem has not been rectified.
When I was selling crime reporting software to the Botswana Police Force, officers raised the concern “The trouble with reporting systems is that they can limit the sort of crime a person can report accidentally or deliberately”. They were right. In Action Fraud’s case it appears to be a product of the fact that this crime has never having been prosecuted before.
Other Police and Crime Commissioners are also acting beyond their delegated powers and operate with multiple identities. They wield significant authority in determining which policing services are procured. Consequently these PCCs have consolidated all fraud and cybercrime investigations under the jurisdiction of the City of London Police City of London Police (National Lead Force | City of London Police).
We are the national lead police force for fraud. We investigate some of the country’s most complex cases of fraud, set the national strategy and coordinate the operational response. We also host Action Fraud, the national reporting centre for fraud and cybercrime, on behalf of policing.
However, the centralisation of responsibilities inherent in this approach poses significant risks to the overall integrity of the system. It inherently undermines the principles of safety and decentralisation, contrary to the fundamental tenets of a secure system. Recently, The City of London Police have outsourced Action Fraud to Capita plc and PwC LLP (New suppliers appointed for Action Fraud service replacement | City of London Police):
Published: 08:5613/06/2023
City of London Police has appointed two new suppliers to provide the fraud and cybercrime reporting service which will replace Action Fraud.
Capita PLC has been appointed to operate the contact centre on behalf of the City of London Police and provide the technology to enable reporting, such as a new website and reporting tool. PwC UK will provide the technology services for the crime and intelligence management that underpins the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB). PwC UK will also support the City of London Police integrate and manage the services.
This public-private partnership centralising fraud and cybersecurity investigation compromises the integrity of our policing and investigative systems.
As a consequence of the actions taken by the Police and Crime Commissioners our local police force is not interested in receiving reports of fraud. Instead we are redirected to Action Fraud, be it a report of a scam or for major organised crime. This one-size-fits-all, standardised approach to crime means that the reports that get accepted for investigation are limited to those crimes for which a precedent has already been set.
When His Majesty’s Inspector assessed the performance of the Sussex Police (20/21) they omitted to report on Sussex Police’s performance in prosecuting serious organised crime.
Without a comprehensive assessment of the force's performance in this area, it's difficult to ascertain the full extent of the challenges they may be facing or the adequacy of their response strategies. However, it underscores the importance of robust oversight and accountability mechanisms to ensure that law enforcement agencies are adequately addressing all facets of criminal activity within their jurisdiction.
Moving forward, it's imperative that such assessments provide a holistic view of law enforcement performance, including their efforts to tackle serious organised crime. This transparency is essential for identifying areas of improvement and ensuring that appropriate resources and strategies are deployed to combat complex criminal networks effectively.
Based on this text I started to write an action plan and asked ChatGPT to complete it. This is was the response:
“Action Plan:
Investigate Other PCC Nominees' Activity in Companies House:
Conduct a thorough investigation into the activities of other Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) nominees by scrutinizing their filings and records in Companies House.
Focus on identifying any irregularities or discrepancies similar to those found in the activities of Katy Bourne.
Document any findings and discrepancies for further analysis and potential action.
Question Katy Bourne on Identity and Directorship Motivations:
Directly question Katy Bourne regarding the motivation behind establishing three identities, particularly one with a false date of birth.
Seek clarification on the reasons behind holding multiple identities and any potential implications regarding transparency and accountability in her role as PCC.
Challenge her on whether she had the delegated powers to serve as a director of entities such as Bluelight Commercial Limited, Police ICT Company (now called Police Digital Services) and College of Policing Limited.
Request detailed explanations and evidence supporting her actions and decisions in these capacities.
Engage in Open Dialogue and Public Scrutiny:
Engage in open dialogue with Katy Bourne and other relevant stakeholders to address concerns regarding identity discrepancies and directorship roles.
Advocate for transparency and accountability within the role of PCC, emphasizing the importance of adhering to legal and ethical standards.
Encourage public scrutiny and participation in the process to ensure that elected officials are held accountable for their actions and decisions.
Seek Legal and Regulatory Guidance:
Consult legal experts and regulatory authorities to assess the legality and compliance of Katy Bourne's actions as a director and PCC nominee.
Obtain guidance on potential avenues for recourse or action if discrepancies or breaches of regulations are identified.
Explore options for raising formal complaints or inquiries with relevant authorities if necessary.
Document and Communicate Findings:
Document all findings, communications, and interactions related to the investigation and questioning of Katy Bourne's activities.
Communicate findings transparently with constituents, stakeholders, and relevant authorities to ensure awareness and accountability.
Advocate for corrective measures or reforms to address any identified shortcomings or gaps in governance and oversight.
Monitor and Follow-Up:
Continuously monitor developments and responses regarding the investigation and questioning of Katy Bourne's activities.
Follow up on inquiries and requests for information to ensure a thorough and comprehensive understanding of the situation.
Remain vigilant in holding elected officials accountable for their actions and promoting integrity and transparency in public office.”
We need an action point in there to ask Chief Constable Jo Shiner to provide evidence of her authority to be a director of The Road Safety Trust and why its subsidiary is under-reporting the revenue it receives running the National Driver Reoffending Scheme, by approximately £80 million. Where is this money accounted for?
If anyone with legal expertise would like to assist me, it would be of immense value in ensuring that the actions and decisions of public officials are held to the highest standards of legality and accountability.