Attorney General failed to register her directorship of The Great Britain/China Centre in the Register of Interest.
Multiple identities in Companies House. Fraud by; false representation, failure to declare interests, and abuse of position?
It has come to light that Member of Parliament and Attorney General Victoria Prentis possesses dual registered identities in Companies House and that she has failed to disclose her interests, appointed to one of these identities, as required by the Code of Conduct. This discovery raises concerns about potential attempts to conceal interests and engage in deceptive practices, thereby undermining the transparency and integrity of parliamentary activities.
Two identities with the name Victoria Mary Boswell Prentis are registered in Companies House, with the same date of birth. The occupations listed for these identities include Attorney General, Member of Parliament, and Civil Service Barrister, strongly indicating that they both belong to Victoria Prentis MP and Attorney General.
Victoria Prentis's first identity has one historic appointment to St Matthew's Conference Centre Limited, appointed on 19 August 1999 and resigned on 9 May 2012. This identity states “Total number of appointments, 1”. An auditor, or someone undertaking due diligence for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing, would take this as confirmation that she has no other interests. However, a search in Companies House, on her name, a step that isn't an established protocol, reveals a second identity. See for yourself by clicking here Victoria Prentis - Find and update company information - GOV.UK (company-information.service.gov.uk).
The second identity registered to Victoria Pentis holds more contemporaneous appointments. An active appointment to The Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales since 25 October 2022, The Great Britain-China Centre, from 14 June 2018 to 31 March 2020, and NACRO, from 26 September 2018 to 14 February 2020.
To ascertain whether Victoria Prentis MP has registered her interests, the Registers of Interests were examined. They are all available here, Register of Members' Financial Interests - UK Parliament. Several reports were referenced, and it was discovered that her three recent directorships were not registered in the Register of Members' Financial Interests. Refer to these reports: as at 16 July 2018, as at 1 October 2018, as at 3 December 2018, as at 1 July 2019, as at 11 January 2020. as at 30 March 2020, as at 21 May 2021 as at 14 November 2022, as at 17 April 2023, and as at 30 May 2023.
In April 2018 she did register, under “Visits outside the UK” that she accepted a donation from: “(1) Great Britain China Centre (with sponsorship from BP and Prudential) (2) International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party (IDCPC) to visit Beijing and Wuhan. To attend the 2018 UK-China Leadership Forum, organised by the Great Britain China Centre and IDCPC; to engage with Chinese Officials on a broad range of topics and to strengthen UK-China bilateral relations. (Registered 23 April 2018)”.
The failure of Victoria Prentis to register her directorship of the Great Britain-China Centre, given her role as the Attorney General, raises significant concerns regarding national security, especially in the context of the ongoing public inquiry into the government's response to COVID-19. The undisclosed directorship, coupled with the sponsorship she had received from this organisation, with connections to the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party, including a visit to Wuhan, a city at the centre of the outbreak, indicates a potential risk of compromised national interests and an impact on public health decision-making.
These findings clearly demonstrate Victoria Prentis' failure to fulfil her obligation to register her interests, raising serious questions about her compliance with the Code of Conduct. Her duplicate identities within Companies House adds further complexity to the situation, indicating potential attempts to deceive and conceal financial interests. I allege that this is evidence of fraud. She made a false declaration to acquire a second identity and she failed to declare it. This meets the definition of fraud by false representation and fraud by failure to declare interests. An investigation into the extent of her fraud is necessitated and to determine whether she has committed fraud by abuse of position.
The issue of duplicate identities within Companies House has significant implications beyond Victoria Prentis' case. Synthetic identities, as they are commonly known in IT systems terminology, can corrupt audits and undermine due diligence efforts for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing. This poses a substantial risk for facilitating serious financial crimes.
Companies House, as the registrar for companies in the UK, holds the responsibility of actively monitoring and minimizing the creation of synthetic identities. Their failure to de-duplicate these records allows synthetic identity fraud to occur, compromising the integrity of the system. It is imperative that Companies House takes immediate action to rectify this situation, and ensure the accuracy and reliability of their records.
It is essential that individuals holding positions of power, especially those involved in matters of national security and public health, demonstrate the utmost transparency and accountability. The failure to disclose such connections undermines public trust and raises questions about the integrity of decision-making processes during a critical period. A comprehensive investigation is necessary to assess the extent of the national security risk posed by these undisclosed directorships and their potential impact on the government's response to COVID-19.