The Road Safety Trust's missing £80million - report to Action Fraud
"Glaring omission suggests a deliberate oversight" - Analysis of Action Fraud's reporting system.
Fraud - Additional Details (2500 characters)
In its latest accounts, UKROED Limited reports income of £88,262,606 for the year ended 31st March 2023, inconsistent with their course delivery data (https://www.ukroed.org.uk/scheme/trends-statistics/). Estimated average revenue (£172,017,374) suggests a significant shortfall, indicating potential false figures (https://www.adrianflux.co.uk/blog/2024/03/complete-guide-ndors-courses/). UKROED Limited declare that The Road Safety Trust (TRST) is its person with ultimate control, in the accounts and on their websites but not in the Companies House registry (https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/08773977/persons-with-significant-control). This is a breach of Section 790 of the Companies Act.
As a victim of UKROED's fraud, having paid £90 on 23 November 2023 for a course, I raise concerns about the accuracy of their accounts.
As background, I note that director of TRST, CC Joanne Shiner, is also in breach of Section 1082, having registered two identities in Companies House (CH) (https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/search/officers?q=Joanne+Shiner). Further, she does not have delegated powers to be a director of The Road Safety Trust (https://www.sussex-cc.gov.uk/media/7537/surrey-sussex-pcc-scheme-of-delegation-2023-final-if.pdf).
Note the CC is "held to account" by the Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC), however there are irregularities with the PCC's non-disclosure of interests eg Bluelight Commercial Limited and as director operated beyond her delegated powers. PCC Katy Bourne had registered three identities in CH, one with a false date of birth, prior to my complaint, which led to deduplication. I have images of her identities prior to deduplication.
Given that the PCC holds the National Road Portfolio on behalf of all PCC colleagues and collaborates closely with the Chief Constable, who similarly holds a national portfolio, Roads Policing Unit, on behalf of all Chief Constables, it blurs the lines between executive and operational functions within the police force. This breaches regulation relating to Separation of Powers.
The audited accounts for SPCC and Sussex Police, made up to 31 March 2023, are overdue (SPCC - Accounts), breaching a fundamental duty of the PCC and CC.
My report has been acknowledged. I am able to update it to correct any errors or improve the information. I will be adding the other directors of UKROEDS Limited and The Road Safety Trust to this report. If I locate multiple registered identities I will report these also.
Issues with Action Fraud’s reporting system
System Timeout: The system unexpectedly times out without warning, causing users to lose any added information if they haven't saved it elsewhere.
File Length Limitation: The character limit for the "Additional Details" section is set at 2500 characters, making it difficult to provide comprehensive information, especially when including lengthy web references.
Address Field Constraints: The fields for addresses do not accommodate Companies House addresses adequately due to their length, posing challenges for accurately inputting relevant information.
Lack of Companies House References: Despite fields for adding Skype and Facebook details, there are no dedicated fields for Companies House references, which are crucial for reporting business-related fraud.
Partial Dates Requirement: Users are required to input a specific day for the date of birth, even when it's unknown, as the system does not accept partial dates. This complicates reporting, particularly when only the month and year are known.
Recommendations:
Implement Warning System: Action Fraud should implement a warning system to notify users before a session timeout occurs, allowing them to save their progress or extend the session if needed.
Expand Character Limit: Action Fraud should increase the character limit for the "Additional Details" section to accommodate detailed descriptions and include lengthy web references without truncation.
Adjust Address Field Length: Action Fraud should adjust the length of address fields to accommodate Companies House addresses or provide a dedicated field for Companies House references.
Include Companies House Fields: Action Fraud should add specific fields for Companies House references in the reporting form to ensure all relevant information, particularly regarding business-related fraud, is captured accurately.
Allow Partial Dates: Action Fraud should allow users to input partial dates for fields like date of birth, enabling them to provide accurate information even when specific details are unknown.
The Action Fraud reporting system, purportedly designed to facilitate the reporting of various forms of crime, is notably deficient, particularly in its handling of company-related offenses; notably, it lacks adequate fields to accommodate Companies House web addresses. This glaring omission suggests a deliberate oversight, hindering the efficacy of reporting and impeding efforts to combat corporate fraud.
Implementing these recommendations will enhance the effectiveness and user-friendliness of Action Fraud's reporting system, enabling more accurate and comprehensive reporting of fraudulent activities.
This report draws on analysis which was published in this article: